

# State Democracy Index 2.0 Report\*

Jacob M. Grumbach<sup>†</sup>  
Francesca Bitton<sup>\*</sup>

December 2, 2024

---

\*We thank Rachel Funk Fordham, Michael Garcia, and Erin Heys for their feedback.

<sup>†</sup>Associate Professor, Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley. [grumbach@berkeley.edu](mailto:grumbach@berkeley.edu)

<sup>\*</sup>Graduate Student (MPP), Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley

# I. Introduction

American democracy continues to come under strain. Growing polarization and distrust, barriers to voter participation, and threats of electoral subversion have affected politics in states across the nation—threatening democratic values such as rule of law, free and fair elections, and respect for fundamental freedoms and rights.

The United States has an especially decentralized form of federalism. In principle, this system allows states to respond to local needs. But it also can create disparities between states, particularly in voter access, fair legislative districting, and political representation. These disparities have been compounded over the past two decades by a series of judicial decisions that have curtailed federal oversight and granted states greater autonomy in determining electoral policies.

The importance of the state level in the U.S. federal system makes it critical to study democracy not just in the country as a whole, but in each of the 50 states. In “Laboratories of Democratic Backsliding,” Grumbach (2022) created the *State Democracy Index* (SDI), a time-series measure of the health of electoral democracy in the states between 2000 and 2018. The SDI was based on 51 indicators that captured the cost of voting, partisan bias in legislative district maps, and other facets of election administration. The measure showed that a substantial number of states had experienced significant democratic backsliding since 2000, and underscored the role of national partisan dynamics in shaping democratic performance (Grumbach 2022).

In this report, we introduce the SDI 2.0. The SDI 2.0 extends the measure’s coverage through the year 2023, encompassing the first Donald Trump presidency, the 2020 redistricting cycle, and electoral policy changes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This report analyses the SDI 2.0 to understand changes and continuity in state level democracy from 2018 to 2023.

## II. SDI 2.0 Data and Measurement Model

The SDI 2.0 includes 54 democracy indicators and covers the years 2000 through 2023.<sup>1</sup> The indicators include measures of electoral policy and administration. Some variables are binary (e.g., absentee voting and same day registration), ordinal (e.g., felon disenfranchisement), and continuous variables (e.g., legislative district efficiency gap). Overall, the SDI 2.0 captures how free, fair, and accessible electoral institutions are in a given state, or the extent to which all members of the polity have equal ability to influence policy outcomes through elections.

Like the original SDI, the SDI 2.0 uses Bayesian factor analysis to estimate a latent dimension of democratic performance using these 54 indicator variables. The measurement model then creates a democracy score for each state-year—the single score that best predicts the *real* pattern of democratic performance that we observe in the data for that state-year. In Appendix Figure A1, we show the discrimination parameters for each of the 54 indicators, which tell us how each indicator affects a state’s SDI 2.0 score. We also create a simple additive index of the indicators; this additive index serves as a validation check and simple alternative for the main SDI 2.0.


---

<sup>1</sup> We added three indicators to those of the original SDI by disaggregating indicators to increase the granularity of measurement.

### **III. Trends in Democratic Performance**

In this section, we use the SDI 2.0 to take a first look at general trends in democratic performance in the states. Figure 1 displays changes in state democracy scores between 2000 and 2023. As a reminder, the SDI and SDI 2.0 are set to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 (i.e., -1.0 or below indicates relatively low performance and 1.0 or higher indicates high performance).


The early 2000s were a relatively stable period for democratic performance across U.S. states, with low variation between states and a middling score in the average state. However, by the 2010s, states, including ones that were toward the top of the distribution in the 2000s, began to backslide. Other states, by contrast, increased their SDI 2.0 scores over the same time period as they set balanced district maps and implemented policies that expanded voter access. As a consequence, states polarized substantially in the quality of their electoral democratic institutions.



**Figure 1: State Democracy by Year**

To take a closer look at this trend, we turn to Figure 2, which shows the average state democracy score over time. In contrast to the mostly stable 2000s, the average state democracy score dramatically declined in the early 2010s. Between 2000 and 2009, the average democracy score was 0.16, compared to -0.13 during the 2010-2019 period.

**Figure 2: Average Democracy Score by Year**




However, the SDI 2.0 tells a slightly hopeful story in the most recent years. Our updated findings indicate a slight improvement in the average democracy score since 2018 (when the original SDI coverage ends), increasing to the current average score of -0.07 in 2023. Although average state democratic performance remains below levels seen in the 2000s, the past several years have been a period of improvement. As we further describe later, this improvement is the product of somewhat more balanced legislative district maps for state legislatures and the U.S. House in the 2020 redistricting cycle, and the diffusion of COVID-era policies that expanded voting access (e.g., automatic registration and universal mail ballots).

While the national average of state democracy scores is informative, a clearer picture emerges when we consider variation between states. Given that the U.S. system of federalism affords states autonomy in setting voter policies and overseeing election administration, disparate electoral policies and opportunities for backsliding become more likely, resulting in greater variation across states (Grumbach 2022; Hale, Monjoy, and Brown 2015).

Figure 3 shows the variance in state democracy scores over time. In the early 2000s, the variance among state democracy scores was low (0.3), indicating that states had similar democracy scores and more uniformity in their democratic institutions. By 2013, the variance had risen to 1.2, peaking in 2015 at a local maximum of 1.4. This sharp increase and relatively high variance

indicates that states are increasingly adopting policies and approaches that contrast one another significantly. This peak began to decline in the following years, dropping to 1.2 by 2017. From 2017 to 2021, variance remained relatively stable, before decreasing slightly to 1.1 in 2022.

**Figure 3: Variance of Democracy Score by Year**



To make sense of the shifts that occurred during the early to mid 2010s, it's essential to consider impacts following the 2010 midterm election and redistricting cycle, as well as the Supreme Court's landmark decision in *Shelby County v. Holder* (2013). Together, these events drove average democracy scores (Figure 2) down from their height in 2009 to their nadir in 2014, while also increasing variation between states (Figure 3).

The 2010 midterm election and redistricting cycle resulted in sweeping gains for Republicans in the states. As Grumbach (2022) showed with the original SDI, states that came under Republican control at this time set legislative district maps that greatly favored their party (often approaching or setting records in partisan district imbalance)<sup>2</sup> and implemented policies and orders that increased the cost of voting (e.g., by increasing wait times for in-person voting in urban areas). In 2011, Wisconsin and Tennessee implemented strict photo identification laws, while Florida,

---

<sup>2</sup> State legislatures employed “packing” and “cracking” strategies that increased the efficiency of their party’s votes while “wasting” more of the opposing party’s votes (Jones 2018; Kirschenbaum and Li, 2021).

Georgia, and Ohio rolled back, or eliminated, early and same day voter registration (Mukpo 2018; Weiser and Norden 2012). Between 2010 and 2012, alone, at least 15 states passed new restrictive provisions, including Alabama, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia (Weiser and Norden 2012).

Further opening the door to state level backsliding, judicial decisions began to reshape electoral oversight. This set the stage for the Supreme Court's decision to strike down Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 2013, which required that states with a history of discriminatory voting practices obtain federal approval before implementing electoral policies that could disproportionately suppress voters of color (Brennan Center 2023; Eubank and Fresh 2022; Aneja and Avenancio-León 2019). Prior to the decision, 15 states were subject to some form of preclearance; however, within months of the Court's decision, states that once were subject to federal oversight began to double down on efforts to restrict voting access, including by implementing strict photo ID laws (Avore 2013). In 2013, Alabama, Texas, Mississippi, and Virginia each introduced such measures, which were enacted over the next several years (Avore 2013; Mississippi Secretary of State 2017; *Veasey v. Abbott*, 2016). As of 2023, at least 94 restrictive voting laws had passed in at least 29 states, and while several have faced litigation or were repealed, most remain in effect (Singh and Carter 2023).

At the same time, other states engaged in efforts to expand voting access. Expansive voting provisions such as automatic voter registration (AVR) and same day registration (SDR) gained support in a number of states under Democratic and divided governmental control. Oregon was the first state to implement an AVR policy in 2016, and by the end of 2018, eight additional states had followed suit, including California, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, and Rhode Island (NCSL 2023a). Similarly, by the end of 2018, Michigan, Utah, and Washington had enacted SDR, adding to the small list of 15 states that already had the policy in place. By 2023, more than 20 states had enacted some form of AVR and SDR (NCSL 2023a; NCSL 2023b). While not all 'convenience voting' reforms have much of an effect on participation, quantitative analysis shows that AVR and SDR significantly increase turnout, especially among historically low-turnout demographic groups such as young people (Grumbach and Hill 2022).

In addition, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic paved the way towards new or modified early voting policies. Between 2019 and 2023, five states, including Kentucky and South Carolina, had adopted a version of early in-person voting, growing the number of states with the policy to 47 by 2023 (NCSL 2023c). Moreover, since 2020, eight states have moved to conducting all mail elections, including California and Washington (NCSL 2023c).

Lastly, the late 2010s and early 2020s have seen renewed efforts towards restoring voting rights to formerly incarcerated felons and people on parole. Since 2019, states including California,




Colorado, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Washington, have each passed expansive provisions (The Sentencing Project 2022).

## IV. Party Control of Government and Democracy in the States

So far we have described *how* electoral democracy has changed in the states. We now turn to the question of *why*. The original SDI 1.0 found significant divergence in democratic performance between Republican- and Democratic-controlled states since the 2000s. In our updated SDI 2.0, we find that this gap in performance persisted through 2023. Figure 4 shows SDI 2.0 scores by party control of government.

**Figure 4: Party Control and State Democracy Over Time**



As shown, by the mid-2000s, states under Democratic party control tended to maintain higher average democracy scores than Republican or divided states. In contrast, states under Republican control show a decline in scores since 2000 and continuing through 2015. While all of the 54 indicators in the SDI 2.0 matter for states' scores, partisan gerrymanders stemming from the 2010 redistricting cycle were especially consequential, particularly in states such as Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin (Royden and Li 2017).

It is worth reiterating the importance of gerrymandering in affecting political representation. Efficiency gap and partisan bias measures, for example, capture how much a party's statewide vote share affects their representation in the legislature. In the 2012, 2014, and 2016 election

cycles, Republicans were able to obtain between 15 and 25 additional U.S. House seats per cycle (Royden and Li 2017).

Michigan and North Carolina serve as two important state cases demonstrating the effects of gerrymandering (PlanScore; Royden and Li 2017). In 2012, Democratic candidates for the Michigan House of Representatives received 54% of the vote, yet Republicans secured eight more seats than their counterparts (Corriher and Kennedy 2017). In the 2014, 2016, and 2018 election, Democratic candidates would once again win a majority of the statewide vote, yet Republicans continued to secure the majority of seats (Tausanovitch and Root 2020). In 2016, Democrats in North Carolina received 47% of the statewide vote, yet only won 23% of open seats, while Republicans won 77% of seats with only 53% of the vote (Common Cause 2019). This result would lead to the landmark *Rucho v. Common Cause* decision in 2019, where the Supreme Court ruled that partisan gerrymanders were beyond the reach of federal courts, allowing state courts the power to approve or strike down contested maps (Supreme Court of the United States 2019). Since the decision, courts in Kansas (*Rivera v. Schwab*) and New Hampshire (*Brown v. Secretary of State*) have ruled that cases of partisan gerrymandering were nonjusticiable political questions, which has allowed for partisan maps to be put into effect, bolstering single party control (Alonzo et. al v. Schwab et al. 2022; Rivera v. Schwab 2022).

While average democracy scores under Republican-controlled states have begun to increase in recent years, the difference between the two parties remains considerable. Meanwhile, states with divided party control display a more stable trajectory, with scores remaining relatively constant until a decrease after 2020. Since states experience shifts in party control over time, it's unclear whether these shifts are truly driving changes in democratic institutions.

In Table 1, we do a systematic analysis of the effect of party control on SDI 2.0 scores. Specifically, our difference-in-differences analysis estimates whether changes in party control lead to changes in the strength of democratic institutions.

**Table 1: Republican Control of Government Reduces Democracy Scores**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>
Republican Control	-0.604*** (0.127)	-0.544*** (0.132)
Republican Control * Post 2018		-0.208 (0.166)
N	1176	1176
# of groups: State	49	49
# of groups: Year	24	24
R-squared (full model)	0.764	0.766
R-squared (proj model)	0.148	0.155
Adj. R-squared (full model)	0.749	0.750
Adj. R-squared (proj model)	0.147	0.153

\*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01; \* p < 0.05


Table 1 indicates that a shift to Republican control reduces a state's democracy score by an average of 0.6 standard deviations. For comparison, Grumbach (2022) reported a slightly smaller effect of 0.4 for Republican control. This difference suggests that the party control effect using the SDI 2.0 measure is somewhat larger.

## V. Case Studies of Key States

Five states stand apart for their distinct patterns of democratic expansion and decline since the early 2000s. This section explores how electoral policies, state-party control, and gerrymandering have impacted these states' democratic performance. The five states we examine are California, Michigan, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington.

As we show in Figure 5, all five of these state cases maintained relatively stable democracy scores in the 2000s. A divergence emerged in 2010, when Michigan, North Carolina, and Tennessee experienced a marked decline in democratic performance, while California and Washington continued to increase their SDI 2.0 scores. Michigan and North Carolina have experienced a rebound since 2017, but Tennessee's performance has remained low, demonstrating the most severe case of democratic backsliding since the 2000s and ranking as the least democratic state in the U.S. according to both the original SDI and the SDI 2.0.

**Figure 5: Democracy Index Trends by State (2000-2023)**



## **Democratic Decline: Tennessee**

According to the SDI 1.0 and 2.0, Tennessee's average score positions it as the least democratic state in the nation in 2018 and 2023, respectively (Beauchamp 2023; Grumbach 2022).

Tennessee has experienced pronounced democratic backsliding since the 2000s, but it also has a longer legacy of democratic challenges.

While many states began to implement new or more restrictive electoral policies in the 2010s, Tennessee has long had relatively restrictive voting laws and election administration. Tennessee does not allow absentee voting, same day voter registration, automatic voter registration, youth pre-registration, or voting rights for formerly or currently incarcerated people (Lane et. al 2023). In 2012, Tennessee implemented one of the strictest voter ID laws in the country, and has since implemented additional provisions on the types of acceptable IDs, ruling out many common forms such as student IDs and city- or county-issued IDs (Tennessee Administrative Office 2023).

For those that are able to successfully cast a ballot, partisan gerrymandering presents additional challenges in translating votes into legislative representation. Prior to the 2000s and through 2010, Tennessee boasted legislative maps that did not tend to skew in favor of either party (PlanScore). The new district maps designed by the Republican-majority legislature in the 2010 redistricting cycle, however, were highly imbalanced. Several major lawsuits were filed against Tennessee, including *Moore v. State* (2012), *Wygant v. Lee* (2022), *Tennessee State Conference of the NAACP, et.al. v. William B Lee* (2023), each alleging that the state violated the Tennessee State Constitution by excessively splitting counties and diluting the power of voters of color, thereby advancing unconstitutional racial gerrymanders (Democracy Docket 2024; Tennessee Court of Appeals). Today, several key districts—which have historically been Democratic strongholds with majority Black constituents—have been divided, including Nashville, which helped Republican lawmakers obtain a supermajority (Edelman 2023).

## **Democratic Improvement: Michigan and North Carolina**

Like Tennessee, Michigan and North Carolina experienced substantial backsliding due to partisan gerrymandering after 2010. However, after 2016, SDI 2.0 scores in Michigan and North Carolina rebounded substantially, with Michigan improving from -1.85 in 2016 to 0.47 in 2023, and North Carolina increasing from -1.87 to -0.30 over the same timeframe. These gains reflect notable recoveries in their performance, attributable to fairer district maps and new policies that expanded access to voting.

North Carolina has been a pivotal battleground for legal challenges concerning electoral policy and redistricting. Over the past decade, North Carolina has enacted several restrictive voting rights laws and approved multiple gerrymandered district maps, some of which have been struck down by federal and state courts. This has contributed to the fluctuations in the states' democracy score since 2012 (Democracy North Carolina 2021; Li et. al. 2023; Royden and Li 2017; Tausanovitch and Root 2020; Selzer 2024). Policy changes that contributed to the observed improvements in SDI 2.0 scores include a judicial block placed on the state's strict voter ID law (2018), expanded youth pre-registration policies (2019), and the restoration of voting rights to formerly incarcerated felons that have completed their sentence and parole (2022) (Avore 2023; NCSL 2024d; Democracy North Carolina 2021; The Sentencing Project 2022).

While the early 2010s showed partisan tilt across North Carolina's state houses, evidenced by efficiency gap and partisan bias scores as high as +10% in favor of Republican candidates, this landscape began to shift in response to a series of key judicial decisions (Klarner 2018, PlanScore). Cases such as *Dickson v. Rucho* (2015) and *Moore v. Harper* (2023) played an instrumental role in setting new standards for assessing gerrymandering and affirmed the role of state courts to intervene and provide judicial oversight. The results of these rulings helped to reduce partisan bias and efficiency gaps, with both decreasing from 10% in 2012 to 7% in 2018, and further to 4% in 2022 (PlanScore).

Michigan, like North Carolina, demonstrated democratic backsliding during the early 2010s. Since 2016, Michigan's democratic performance has improved due in part to new electoral reforms and state-led efforts to establish more balanced district maps. In 2018, Michigan voters approved a pair of constitutional amendments, Proposal 2 and Proposal 3, which established absentee voting and early voting policies, same day and automatic voter registration, and an independent redistricting commission, which shifted the power to draw congressional and legislative districts away from the partisan state legislature (Verhovek 2024).

Evidence shows that Michigan's Independent Redistricting Commission created more balanced maps, which, in turn, led to greater equality in political representation between Michiganders. Michigan's 2012-2020 state house district map had at least +8% partisan bias and efficiency gap statistics that favored Republicans, compared to just +4% and +0%, respectively, in 2022 (PlanScore). However, it's important to note that the Commission is facing legal challenges regarding its drawing of boundaries in Black-majority districts, such as in the city of Detroit (U.S. District Court for the Western district of Michigan 2023).

Together, the policy reforms and judicial interventions have contributed to North Carolina and Michigan's gradual rebound in democratic performance, by both addressing structural barriers and electoral access.

## **High Performers: California and Washington**

As of 2023, California and Washington are two of the highest performing states. While this has long been true for Washington, California's trajectory has been marked by a series of dips and recoveries.

During the 2000s (see Figure 5), California's average score was 0.4, putting it above average, but not especially so, during this time period. Notably, California's performance experienced modest declines in two major periods—2002-2010 and 2014-2018—with each dip followed by gradual recoveries. Between 2010 and 2019, California's score increased to 0.80, and by 2023, it further improved its ranking to within the top 10% of states.

California offers an important example of democratic expansion fueled by new voter reforms. Since 2008, California has enacted same day voter registration and automatic voter registration, expanded voting access to formerly incarcerated felons, and moved to largely all-mail elections. Still, despite having an independent redistricting commission since 2008, California state legislative maps show a moderate Democratic advantage in its efficiency gap and partisan bias.

Washington was the highest performing state during the 2010-2019 period, and remains the highest performing state as of 2023. Across positive indicators of democratic performance, there are few policies that Washington has not implemented, with the exception of allowing people who are currently incarcerated to vote. Further, like California and Michigan, its congressional and state legislative district boundaries are drawn by an independent redistricting commission, and the commission has largely done well to keep efficiency and partisan gap scores low (PlanScore). In both the 2010 and 2020 redistricting cycles, Washington's legislative maps were among the most balanced in the country.

## **VII. Conclusion**

This report introduces the SDI 2.0, a measure of state level electoral democracy performance covering the years 2000 through 2023, and conducts preliminary analysis of recent trends across the states. While overall democratic performance is improving across the U.S, continuing to address these effects will be critical towards ensuring an inclusive, representative, and resilient democracy. We hope that other researchers find use for the SDI 2.0 in studies of the causes and effects of changes in democratic institutions.



## References

- ACLU Kansas. “Alonzo et al. v. Schwab et al. (Rivera v. Schwab),” February 15, 2022.  
<https://www.aclukansas.org/en/cases/alonzo-et-al-v-schwab-et-al-rivera-v-schwab>.
- Aneja, Abhay P., and Avenancio-León, Carlos F.. 2019. “Disenfranchisement and Economic Inequality: Downstream Effects of Shelby County v. Holder.” AEA Papers and Proceedings 109 (May): 161–65.
- Avore, Liz. “10 Years Since Shelby County v. Holder: Where We Are and Where We’re Heading.” Voting Rights Lab, June 27, 2023.  
<https://votingrightslab.org/2023/06/27/10-years-since-shelby-v-holder-where-we-are-and-where-were-heading/>.
- Beauchamp, Zack. “Tennessee’s Expulsions of Two Legislators Highlight That It’s the Least Democratic State.” Vox, April 7, 2023.  
<https://www.vox.com/policy/2023/4/7/23673998/tennessee-expulsions-state-democracy-measure>.
- Bonica, Adam, Jacob M. Grumbach, Charlotte Hill, and Hakeem Jefferson. "All-mail voting in Colorado increases turnout and reduces turnout inequality." *Electoral studies* 72 (2021): 102363.
- Brennan Center for Justice. The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder on the Voting Rights Act. Published June 21, 2023.  
<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/effects-shelby-county-v-holder-voting-rights-act>.
- Common Cause. “Common Cause v. Rucho,” June 17, 2019.  
<https://www.commoncause.org/work/common-cause-v-rucho/>.
- Corriher, Billy, and Liz Kennedy. “Distorted Districts, Distorted Laws,” September 19, 2017.  
<https://www.americanprogress.org/article/distorted-districts-distorted-laws/>.
- Democracy Docket. “Democracy Docket, Court Cases,” Last modified 2024.  
<https://www.democracydocket.com/state/tennessee/>.
- Democracy North Carolina. *A Brief History of Voter Suppression in North Carolina*. December 2021.

<https://democracync.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Brief-History-of-Voter-Suppression-in-NC-2.pdf>.

Edelman, Adam. "How Redistricting Brought Tennessee to This Moment." NBC News, April 11, 2023.

<https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/redistricting-brought-tennessee-moment-rcna78953>.

Elul, Gabrielle, Sean Freeder, and Jacob M. Grumbach. "The effect of mandatory mail ballot elections in California." *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy* 16, no. 3 (2017): 397-415.

Eubank, Nicholas, and Adriane Fresh. "Enfranchisement and Incarceration after the 1965 Voting Rights Act." *American Political Science Review* 116, no. 3 (2022): 791–806.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421001337>.

Grumbach, Jacob M. "Laboratories of democratic backsliding." *American Political Science Review* 117, no. 3 (2023): 967-984.

Grumbach, Jacob. *Laboratories against democracy: How national parties transformed state politics*. Vol. 184. Princeton University Press, 2022.

Hale, Kathleen, Robert Montjoy, and Mitchell Brown. *Administering Elections*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137388452>.

Iyer, Sundeep, and Keesha Gaskins. *Redistricting and Congressional Control: A First Look*. New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2012.

[https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report\\_Redistricting\\_Congressional\\_Control.pdf](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Redistricting_Congressional_Control.pdf).

Jones, Malia. "Packing, Cracking And The Art Of Gerrymandering Around Milwaukee." UW-Madison Applied Population Lab, 2018.

<https://apl.wisc.edu/shared/tad/packing-cracking>.

King, Desmond. 2017. "Forceful Federalism against American Racial Inequality." *Government and Opposition* 52 (2): 356–82. CrossRefGoogle Scholar

- Kirschenbaum, Julia, and Michael Li. "Gerrymandering Explained." Brennan Center for Justice. 2021. <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/gerrymandering-explained>.
- Klarner, Carl, 2018, "State Legislative Election Returns, 1967-2016: Restructured For Use", <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DRSACA>, Harvard Dataverse, V1.
- Lane, Gicola, Danielle Lang, and Kate Uyeda. "Tennessee Three Proceedings Are Just the Tip of the State's Anti-Democracy Iceberg." Campaign Legal Center, April 13, 2023. <https://campaignlegal.org/update/tennessee-three-proceedings-are-just-tip-states-anti-democracy-iceberg>.
- Li, Michael, Peter Miller, and Gina Feliz. "Anatomy of a North Carolina Gerrymander." Brennan Center for Justice, October 27, 2023. <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/anatomy-north-carolina-gerrymander>.
- Mickey, Robert. 2015. Paths out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America's Deep South, 1944-1972, Vol. 147. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Google Scholar
- Mississippi Secretary of State. 2017. *Not Our Grandfathers' Mississippi Anymore: Implementing Mississippi's Voter Identification Requirement*. Published in the *Mississippi Law Journal*. Revised April 11, 2017. [https://www.sos.ms.gov/content/documents/Elections/Voter%20ID%20Law%20Review%20Article\\_Revised%20041117.pdf](https://www.sos.ms.gov/content/documents/Elections/Voter%20ID%20Law%20Review%20Article_Revised%20041117.pdf).
- Moore v. State of Tennessee. 2014. Court of Appeals of Tennessee. May 15, 2014. <https://casetext.com/case/moore-v-state-2286>
- Mukpo, Ashoka. "The Battle Over Voting Rights In America Is Red-Hot." *American Civil Liberties Union* (blog), October 31, 2018. <https://www.aclu.org/news/voting-rights/the-battle-over-voting-rights-in-america-is-red-hot-heres-what-has-changed-since-2010>.
- National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL a). "Automatic Voter Registration." Last modified 2023. <https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-voter-registration>.

National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL b). "Same-Day Voter Registration." Last modified 2023.

<https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-voter-registration>.

National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL c). "Early In-Person Voting." Last modified 2023. <https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/early-in-person-voting>.

National Congress of State Legislatures (NCSL d). "Preregistration for Young Voters," Last modified 2024.

<https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/preregistration-for-young-voters>.

Royden, Laura, and Michael Li. Extreme Maps. Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2017.

<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/extreme-maps>

Selzer, Rachel. "Federal Judge Strikes Down North Carolina Law Criminalizing Felony Voting." Democracy Docket, April 23, 2024.

<https://www.democracymocket.com/news-alerts/federal-judge-strikes-down-north-carolina-law-criminalizing-felony-voting/>.

Singh, Jasleen, and Sarah Carter. "States Have Added Nearly 100 Restrictive Laws Since SCOTUS Gutted the Voting Rights Act 10 Years Ago." Brennan Center for Justice, June 23, 2023.

<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/states-have-added-nearly-100-restrictive-laws-scotus-gutted-voting-rights>.

Stephanopoulos, Nicholas O., and Christopher Warshaw. "The impact of partisan gerrymandering on political parties." Legislative Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2020): 609-643.

Supreme Court of the United States. *Rucho v. Common Cause*, No. 18-422, Argued March 26, 2019, Decided June 27, 2019. 2019.

[https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-422\\_9o11.pdf](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-422_9o11.pdf).

Tausanovitch, Alex, and Danielle Root. "How Partisan Gerrymandering Limits Voting Rights."

Center for American Progress, July 8, 2020.

<https://www.americanprogress.org/article/partisan-gerrymandering-limits-voting-rights/>.

Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts. “Tennessee Supreme Court Upholds Voter ID Act,” October 17, 2023.

<https://www.tncourts.gov/press/2013/10/17/tennessee-supreme-court-upholds-voter-id-act>

The American Redistricting Project. “Rivera v. Schwab,” August 26, 2022.

<http://thearp.org/litigation/rivera-v-schwab/>.

The Sentencing Project. Locked Out 2022: Estimates of People Denied Voting. October 2022.

<https://www.sentencingproject.org/app/uploads/2024/03/Locked-Out-2022-Estimates-of-People-Denied-Voting.pdf>.

U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. *Agee, Jr. v. Benson*, No. 1:22-cv-00272, Opinion and Order, December 21, 2023. <https://clearinghouse.net/doc/144678/>.

*Veasey v. Abbott*. 2016. Supreme Court Order Denying Application to Vacate Stay, April 29, 2016. Supreme Court of the United States.

Verhovek, Kendall Karson. “Michigan Blazes a Path for Pro-Democracy Reform.” Brennan Center for Justice, August 12, 2024.

<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/michigan-blazes-path-pro-democracy-reform>.

Weiser, Wendy R., and Lawrence Norden. *Voting Law Changes in 2012*. New York: Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, 2011.

[https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/Report\\_Voting\\_Law\\_Changes\\_2012.pdf](https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/Report_Voting_Law_Changes_2012.pdf).

# Appendix

**Figure A1: Discrimination Parameters of Democracy Indicators**

